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I.  INTRODUCTION
    As far a lot of studies have explored conditions for the Cournot equilibrium to be stable. Earlier 
studies in the literature concerning the stability of the Cournot equilibrium such as Fisher (1961), 
Hahn (1962), and Okuguchi (1964, 1976, 1999) assumed that (1) for each firm, marginal cost should
rise more rapidly than marginal revenue, with other firms expanding their ‘collective’ output, and 
that (2) for each firm, marginal cost should not fall more rapidly than market demand for total 
industry output. The first assumption was given as a sufficient condition for the profit maximization 
problem of the firms, which is known as the second-order condition for the optimum. The second 
assumption was given as a condition for the Cournot equilibrium to be stable, which we call 
Fisher-Hahn-Okuguchi condition.
Seade (1980) and Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1985) gave additional conditions for the Cournot 
equilibrium to be unstable. However, we find a counterexample such that their assumptions are no 
longer compatible with the second-order condition for the optimum. In this paper we explore 
alternative conditions for the Cournot equilibrium to be (locally asymptotically) stable or unstable 
which are still compatible with the second-order condition for the optimum.
Our findings are summarized as follows. The Cournot equilibrium may not be stable even if 
F-H-O condition is satisfied. However, as long as a game by symmetric firms (i.e., the firms which 
produce homogenous goods with identical cost functions) is concerned, the Cournot equilibrium is 
unstable whenever F-H-O condition is not satisfied, which is contrary to the results we have known 
in the literature on the stability of the Cournot equilibrium.
3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formulate a basic model of 
Cournot oligopoly with homogenous products. In Section III we discuss the existing conditions for 
the Cournot equilibrium to be stable or unstable. We also explore alternative stability or instability 
conditions being still compatible with the second-order condition for the optimum. In Section IV we 
provide a concluding remark.
II.  A BASIC MODEL
We assume that there are n (fixed) firms in an industry, labeled i = 1, … , n respectively, each of 
which produces xi (≥ 0) units of homogenous commodities to be sold in a single market. Denote by X
= Σi=1nxi the total output in the industry. Let p = P(X) be the market demand, where p is the market 
price of the good. We assume that the function P(X) is continuous, twice differentiable, and
monotonically decreasing.
Consider the interval 0 ≤ xi ≤ M for each i, where M is a number such that P(X) = 0 for X ≥ M. 
We write x–i = (x1, … , xi–1, xi+1, … , xn) which consists of all components but xi.
Let Ci(xi) be the cost of firm i to produce xi unit of the output. We assume that the function
Ci(xi) is continuous, twice differentiable, and monotonically increasing.
The profit of firm i is written in the form πi(xi, x–i) = P(X)xi – Ci(xi). Note that πi(xi, x–i) is 
continuous since P(X) and Ci(xi) are continuous by assumption. In order to guarantee the 
non-negative profit, we may assume that Ci(0) = 0 for all i.1
Firm i maximizes the profit πi(xi, x–i) = P(X)xi – Ci(xi) with respect to the output xi, taking all the 
other components x–i = (x1, … , xi–1, xi+1, … , xn) as given. The first-order condition for the optimum is 
given by
P(φi(x–i) + Σj≠i xj) + φi(x–i)P' (φi(x–i) + Σj≠i xj) –Ci' (φi(x–i)) = 0,                        (1)
where xiC = φi(x–i) is the reaction function of firm i. 2
In order to guarantee that the solution xiC of equation (1) uniquely exists and is stable, we 
assume that πi(xi, x–i) is strictly concave:
Condition 1.    ∂2πi/∂xi2 = (P' + xiP") + (P' –Ci") < 0  at xiC  for all i.
We see that given Condition 1, the second-order condition for the optimum is satisfied.
The following is what we call Fisher-Hahn-Okuguchi condition:
Condition 2.    P' –Ci" < 0  at xiC  for all i.
4Among the following assumptions, (A3) and (B2) are due to Seade (1980), and (A3), (H1), 
(B2) due to Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1985):
(A3)    (P' + xiP") + (P' –Ci") < 0  at xiC  for all i,
(H1)    P'–Ci" < 0  at xiC  for all i,
(B2)    (–1/n)(P' –Ci") ≤ P' + xiP"  at xiC  for all i.
Note that the assumptions (A3) and (H1) are exactly the same as Condition 1 and Condition 2, 
respectively. In particular, we find a counterexample such that (H1) and (B2) do not satisfy (A3):
Counterexample. Suppose that (–1/n)(P' –Ci") ≤ P' + xiP" at xiC for all i, as in (B2). For fixed m ≥ n, 
if 0 < (–1/n)(P' –Ci") ≤ (1/m)(P' + xiP") ≤ P' + xiP" at xiC for all i, where (H1) is taken into account, 
then 0 < (–1/n)(P' –Ci") ≤ (1/m)(P' + xiP") ≤ (1/n)(P' + xiP"), whence (1/n){(P' + xiP") + (P' –Ci")} 
> 0. Hence (A3) is violated.
We address the following condition instead of Condition 2:
Condition 3.    (–1/n)(P' –Ci") > max{0, P' + xiP"}  at xiC  for all i.
We observe that Condition 3 satisfies both Condition 1 and Condition 2. In fact, if (i) 0 > P' + xiP", 
then P' + xiP" < 0 < (–1/n)(P' –Ci") < (–1)(P' –Ci"). Hence (P' + xiP") + (P' –Ci") < 0 with P' –Ci"
< 0. On the other hand, if (ii) 0 < P' + xiP", then 0 < P' + xiP" < (–1/n)(P' –Ci") < (–1)(P' –Ci"). 
Hence (P' + xiP") + (P' –Ci") < 0 with P' –Ci" < 0.
III.  STABILITY OF THE COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM
From now on we explore the (dynamic) stability of the Cournot oligopoly solution. We consider 
an output adjusting process in which once an actual output xi diverges at time t from the Cournot 
equilibrium output xiC, that is,
dxi/dt = KiΔi,                                                                (2)
where Ki > 0 is a constant and Δi = xiC –xi for i = 1, … , n.3
Suppose a Lyapounov function W such that
W(t) = Σi= 1nKi(Δi)2/2,                                                    (3)
5where W(t) > 0 for all t unless Δi = 0 for all i. Differentiating W with respect to t, we have
dW/dt = –[ΣiqiKiΔiΣj≠i KjΔj + Σi(KiΔi)2].                                           (4)
Taking the total derivative of equation (1), we have dxiC/dt = –qiΣj≠idxj/dt, where
qi = (P' + xiP")/{(P' + xiP") + (P'–Ci")}  at xiC  for all i,                            (5)
which is equal to –∂φi/∂xj, i, j = 1, … , n, j ≠ i, with qi < 1 (resp. > 1) as P' –Ci" < 0 (resp. > 0). 
Immediately we see that Condition 2 is compatible with Condition 1 if and only if qi < 1 for all i.
Unless Δi = 0 for all i, we have inductively
dW/dt = –(K1Δ1, … , KnΔn)AT(K1Δ1, … , KnΔn),                                  (6)
where A = (aij) is a real symmetric n×n matrix such that aii = 1 for all i, aij = (1/2)(qi + qj) = aji for 
all j ≠ i, and T(K1Δ1, … , KnΔn) is a transpose of (K1Δ1, … , KnΔn). From linear algebra we conclude 
that A is positive definite, and hence the sign of (6) is < 0 for all KiΔi ≠ 0, if and only if all 
eigenvalues of A are positive.4
If all firms produce with identical cost functions Ci = C(xi) for all i, then we have x1C = …  = xnC. 
We write xiC = xC (constant) for all i. Hence qi = q (constant) at xiC = xC for all i. The characteristic 
polynomial of A with eigenvalues λ is expressed as
FA(λ) = det(λE –A)                                                           (7)
           =    λ–1   –q      … –q  
         –q     λ –1     … –q  
…                    
–q      –q   … λ –1  
= (λ – 1 + q)n–1{λ – 1 – (n – 1)q},
where E is the unit n×n matrix. We observe that all eigenvalues λ of A are positive if and only if 
–1/(n – 1) < q < 1. Note that –1/(n – 1) < q < 1 is equivalent to Condition 3. We have just proved:
Proposition 1. Given Condition 3, the Cournot symmetric equilibrium is stable.
Seade (1980) asserted that, given (A3) and (B2), the Cournot equilibrium is unstable. 
Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1985) asserted that, given (A3), (H1), and (B2), the Cournot equilibrium is 
unstable. However, as mentioned above, neither (H1) nor (B2) is compatible with (A3).
6Proposition 1 implies that provided that a Lyapounov function for the dynamic output 
adjustment process can be found, the Cournot symmetric equilibrium is unstable whenever 
Condition 3 is not satisfied, that is, if any of the following two cases occurs:
Case (a)  q ≤–1/(n – 1), or equivalently, (–1/n)(P' –C") ≤ P' + xCP", which is the same as (B2).
Case (b)  q ≥ 1, or equivalently, –(P' + xCP") > P' –C" ≥ 0, which is the negation of (H1).
Case (a), together with Condition 1, leads to the same results as those in Seade (1980). Case (b) is 
another condition for the Cournot equilibrium to be unstable, which was not given in the existing 
literature. Consequently, we have:
Proposition 2. If either (B2) is satisfied or (H1) is not satisfied, then the Cournot symmetric 
equilibrium is unstable.
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have explored conditions for the Cournot equilibrium to be locally asymptotically stable or
unstable which are still compatible with the second-order condition for the optimum.
The main results are summarized as follows.
The Cournot equilibrium may not be stable even if F-H-O condition is satisfied. However, as 
long as a game by symmetric firms is concerned, the Cournot equilibrium is unstable whenever
F-H-O condition is not satisfied. In this sense, that F-H-O condition is not satisfied is sufficient for 
the Cournot equilibrium to be unstable. These results had not been pointed out in the existing 
literature.
    Gal-Or (1985), considering a game in which two symmetric players move sequentially, showed 
that whether the first mover gains more or less than the second mover depends on whether the 
reaction functions of the players are downwards or upwards sloping. Okuguchi (1999), comparing a 
sequential-mover game (i.e., Stackelberg duopoly) and a simultaneous-mover game (i.e., Cournot 
duopoly), showed that which of the first mover, second mover, and simultaneous mover is more 
advantageous than the others depends on the slope of the reaction functions. The results of 
comparison among the first-mover, second-mover, and simultaneous-mover advantage may depend 
on whether the conditions discussed in this paper are satisfied or not. It is left to future studies to 
investigate this problem.
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8FOOTNOTES
1. As to this point, see Okuguchi (1976).
2. A Cournot equilibrium is defined as a pair (xiC, x–iC) such that πi(xiC, x–iC) ≥ πi(xi, x–iC) for all xi. 
Consider the map φ: {x1, … , xn} → {x1C, … , xnC}, in terms of its coordinates, (φ1, … , φn), such that 
φi: x–i |→ xiC. If xiC ∊ φi(x–i), then φi is called the reaction correspondence of firm i. One could show 
the following properties of the function φi: (i) φi is continuous; (ii) φi is differentiable in an open 
neighborhood of x–iC. Using these properties, we can find that there exists a pair (xiC, x–iC) of the 
Cournot equilibrium. Proofs of the existence of the Cournot equilibrium are found in Burger (1963), 
Frank Jr. and Quandt (1963), Friedman (1977), and Okuguchi (1976), for example.
3. In the earlier literature on the stability of the Cournot oligopoly solution, Theocharis (1960), 
Fisher (1961), McManus and Quandt (1961), Hahn (1962), and Okuguchi (1964) considered output
adjustment process.
4. Hahn (1962) assumed qi < 1 for all i, which was the “worst” case where the term ΣiqiKiΔiΣj≠iKjΔj
in the right-hand side of (4) might be negative. In the case of duopoly (i.e., i = 1, 2), we see that the 
sign of (6) is < 0 if and only if –2 < q1 + q2 < 2, so it suffices to assume that | qi | < 1 for all i.
